Abstract: This paper addresses the deconstructive questioning of the international economic expression of the LLC/Limited Liabilty Company and its role in global capitalism. Through an analysis of its constitutive notions in the context of post-Fordist production and the relationship to the issue of creativity, my goal is to demonstrate the opposite of the confirmation that such an expression emphasizes in the language and enables in reality. My thesis is to prove that today the multitude is acting within the limitless potential of human, social and cultural creativity.
What does it mean to make a statement about something and to implement it in the law at the global level? The international expression "Limited Liability Company" 1 is a hybrid form of a legal, most often private business organization that can designate a property, partnership or corporation. It allows its owners to have limited responsibilities in their business. In various languages it may even designate a society. The history of the term dates differently in different geographical areas and has differ-1 In Serbia, the name for LLC is: Društvo Ograničene Odgovornosti -DOO, in France it is: Société à Responsabilité Limitée − SARL), in Italy it is: Società a Responsabilità Limitata − SRL, in Germany it is: Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung − GmbH; in Russia it is: Общество с ограниченной ответственностью − OOO. This term literally has the same meaning in different countries whereas in the United Kingdom it is slightly modified as Limited Liability Partnership − LLP, and in USA it is Limited Liability Company − LLC. ent initial capital. However, it is important to note that the limitation of responsibilities towards the company does not relieve the owners of personal responsibility in the business or in those cases in which they might be held liable before the law.
If the mastering of matter and physical resources is considered to be the central achievement of the 20 th century, we have to wonder with what values we will be dealing with as a society in the future. If limited responsibilities companies (LLC) and societies (SRL, GmBH, DOO) are understood to be significant elements of capitalist society, we could ask if a limitation on responsibilities in fact leads to the full mastering of any issue or not.
When we talk about society, we are talking about multitude, about being many and this implies the concepts of identity, of belonging, of sharing. We thus speak of man, a being who is in an absolute sense of attitude, towards himself, the other and to the other. In this process, we activate our relationship with responsibility, ethical relations on which knowledge, creativity and social life are based, as is suggested by authors such as Emmanuel Levinas.
2 Temporality and ephemerality are also viewed as substances of space-time and identity. If phenomenology and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy places the human body at the heart of the experiential world, the process of our relation to the experiences of the everyday limitations of responsibilities in capitalist society 3 , becomes a crucial question. Ponty consistently pointed out that it is only "through our own body as a living center of intentionality […] that we choose our, our world and that the world chooses us. " 4 We might wonder if we, as a society and as individuals, are responsible enough for urban and spatial iconography on a daily basis that, constructed, constructs our individual sensory processes. We should discover how responsible we are for the spatial images toward which we found ourselves passively surrendered. To a significant extent an individual is the author of his own space but to certain extent he/she is also shaping the spaces of others. Who is, what is an author?
5 Why do we need an author? Today with terms like LLC, we publicly declare that our responsibilities are limited. But, if the early avant-gardes with studies of color, light, form, text and symbols were already rooted in phenomenology one century ago, we must wonder if we have applied any knowledge of our legacies while shaping the public consciousness nowadays. While questioning whether we construct reality or reality constructs us, the understanding of the expression limited responsibilities companies (LLC) and societies (SRL, GmBH, DOO) 6 points to the existence of non-significant differences in the meanings of both: its integrity and its constituent parts. And it is precisely this place of non-significant difference in meanings that might be important to consider the notion of responsibility in the Derridian sense on two grounds: on the basis of the responsibility of translation 7 and in the deconstructivist sense.
8
To think about the literary meaning produced by the term "Society of Limited Responsibility" in relation to different spaces, contexts, geographies and societies, and in the context of its potential cultural, social and political relevance, means dealing with the notion of presence as such. When we say that we are a society, and that our responsibilities are limited in terms of any realization, we must wonder about the consistency of such realization if both the producer and the one who accepts them participate collectively in the statement of limited responsibility. The link between the three concepts, of sociality, of limitations and the concept of responsibility and in what relationship do these concepts stand, becomes evident. The tone of their common meaning is linking them and one might wonder what kind of tone is it and by what constellation of their relationships is it produced. What responsibility does this tone arouse in the context of the functioning of society: a feeling of distrust or trust, ignorance or knowledge, risk or security, alienation or belonging? Paradoxically, to act under the assertion of responsibility for the limitation of action, means to be certain of one's own knowledge. The 20 th century showed us how and what we have done, produced or acted 9 in the discourse of limited responsibilities. If Jacques Derrida points out that Levinas leaves us with a magnificent study of hospitality, thinking of our encounter and attitude towards the other, of the ethics of full commitment to the other, he then confronts us with the political and institutional issues of our time and the culture of responsibility toward each other.
10 But, how do we feel as part of a society of limited responsibilities, is an important question. Our 'saying' goodbye and our acceptance to become limited in our responsibilities is an object of our preoccupation.
The Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman warns us, with his concept of the liquidity of life and the modern era, a fluidity that is contrary to stability and foundation, of how much the world around us is fragmented into astonishingly well-coordinated segments. In contrast to that, our individual lives are structured by a succession of fragile, related episodes. Bauman notes that our age does not recognize the notion of a well-organized society of regulations and ideas, coherence and continuous 7 Jacques Derrida in the book About the Apocalyptic Tone Adopted Recently in Philosophy explains that the word apocalypse nowhere else has the kind of meaning like the one received in French and in other languages: a terrible catastrophe. Namely, by conveying the Greek and Hebrew language, he explains that the apocalypto means: "I uncover, open up, give away a thing that can be part of the body, head or eyes, or anything hidden, a secret, a thing to hide, a thing that is not shown and not says, maybe expresses, but does not have to be immediately seen. " Žak Derida, O apokaliptičnom tonu usvojenom nedavno u filosofiji (Podgorica: Oktoih, 1995), 10. 8 As the starting point, I take the term Limited Liability Society from the mother tongue in which Company stands for Society, as well as it does in German, Italian and French. identity.
11 According to his opinion, identities float everywhere, we can feel ourselves everywhere at home, but in reality we lack that sense of belonging while searching for it. He points out that the problem of identity should be understood as an objective rather than as a predetermined factor given to us by birth, class or national affiliation, or work. He suggests that identity is revealed when we construct it starting from nothing, when we create it, when we invent it before we find or discover it. In contemporary society however, the question of identity has been brought to the level of daily preoccupation. According to Bauman, and paradoxically, only several decades ago the problem of identity was not even a subject of sociological studies. It was only an "object of philosophical meditation".
12 Addressing the genealogy of the concept of identity, Bauman starts to consider the issue of territorial or national affiliation, and in this process he goes back to the 18 th century. 13 For example, in the midst of the nation-building process for most French regional residents, the notion of a country or a homeland was a region of 20km in relation to their home. During that epoch, the distance from Paris to Marseilles was crossed over as in the era of the Roman Empire. The notion of society as a totality coincided with the immediate neighbor. Therefore Bauman reminisces of Philippe Robert's inventive interpretation of the then "societies of family reciprocity" in which everybody's place in society was evident and in which any problem would be only marginal and resolved ad hoc.
14 With this reference to the sociability of the 18 th century, Bauman stresses that it took a long time to disintegrate the processes of local societies as centers of human coexistence, in order to create a background for the emergence of the notion of identity "as a problem and as a task": After all, asking 'who are you' makes sense only if you know you can be something different than what you are: it only makes sense if you have a choice, and if what to choose depends on you; it makes sense, that is, only if you have to do something to consolidate and make 'real' the choice . 15 Bauman concludes that the idea of identity is not a 'natural' starting point for human experience. 16 It is an idea that we are forced into by our contemporary way of life, which is created by a sense of a crisis of security and pressure to alleviate the gap between what one should be and what one is. He stresses that identity can become a part of a way of life only as "a task that has not yet been realized" 17 or fulfilled, just as a desire, while the emerging contemporary society has done everything to turn such a task into an obligation. With technological and economic progress, he continues, two coexisting, intermittent problems with the notion of identity occur simultaneously, Ibid, 19. and it is impossible to determine the moment when one moves into another: the problem of alienation from the inherited (in terms of race, state, family or class) and the problem of belonging to new groups that would produce their identities through their members. Here, Bauman is referring to virtual Internet groups, which are easy to access and which produce the 'feeling of Us' . They are easy to abandon, but in fact, alienate us from spontaneous interaction with reality, or distance us from the latter.
18
In this new era of liquid modernity, a world of high speed and visible acceleration, of fluttering opportunities and fragile security, the identities of the 'old style' are inflexible and they are losing their clear forms. "The idea of a 'better world' , if not completely disappeared, has evaporated to the state of contingent group or category claims. "
19
Is therefore the endeavor of a limited liability society (company), inter alia, to actively ignore the activity of introspection, its forms of work, production and action? Or is it to allow this view to the necessary extent, but not to stay engaged with it for too long? In that sense, Bauman introduces us to another victim of the era of globalization and sees it in the form of human waste production or the production of rejected people, superfluous to the completion of the economic cycle:
'The problem of capitalism' , the most glaring and potentially explosive dysfunction of the capitalist economy, has passed, from its actual planetary stage, from exploitation to exclusion. The exclusion, and not exploitation, as Marx had suggested a century and a half ago, which is today at the basis of the most visible cases of social polarization, of an inequality that becomes more profound and of increasing volumes of poverty, misery and human humiliation.
20
Considering Jürgen Habermas's idea of "constitutive patriotism", Bauman believes that such a societal solution would be a possible conclusion to the dilemmas facing various questions of how to live together, while at the same time managing to preserve individual freedoms. In the feelings of abandonment and exclusion, the excluded are referred to their own abilities, taking (for themselves) and initiatives. 21 Bauman asks himself: "How to achieve unity in (despite the?) difference and how to preserve the difference in (despite the?) unity?"
22
In the process of understanding the concept of society, besides identity, it is necessary to speak of the multitude and the people. To clear out the difference between these two terms, the Italian semiologist and philosopher Paolo Virno goes back to the 17 th century. 23 He points out that the choice between these two opposite concepts was the center of political-social categories and theoretical-philosophical controversies of the 18 modern era in the processes of establishing centralized modern states, incorporating the opposite views of Baruch Spinoza and Thomas Hobbes. For Spinoza, the multitude represented a permanent form seen in human freedom, and the social and political existence for many, for the collective action of joint actions without becoming One. 24 Virno develops Spinoza's thought and says that the multitude does not renounce the 'One' , but redefines it. 25 For Hobbes, the concept of people refers to the notion of the state and from the establishment of the notion of a state, there should be 'One-nation' . According to him, the notion of multitude, unlike the notion of people, would abolish political unity and oppose authority. In his book A Grammar of the Multitude, Virno critically and creatively exudes the ultimate field of meaning of these two terms: "if there are people, there is no multitude; if there is a multitude, there are no people. " 26 Virno understands the notion of the multitude as the resonance of many contemporary social phenomena. He wonders whether the use of the term multitude might be worth considering in sociological, political and philosophical theory for a better tomorrow. Like Bauman, he is interested in acceleration, changeability and action of the new workforce "whose working hours virtually extend to their entire life", later defined by Johnathan Crary as 24/7 living. 27 Virno also wonders what we are capable of producing today while equipped with technical knowledge and socialized intelligence. 28 Very close but nevertheless different from Bauman, Virno does not consider 'exclusion' but the potential 'involvement' of all -the postmodern multitude -in the current social experiment of existence. Therefore, it is here necessary to return to the tone of the meaning of a "limited liability (society) company" and to think of it in the imagination of the laboratory context of Baumanian exclusion and Virno's involvement. It becomes understandable that in the post-Fordist economy, it is not the product from which surplus value is extracted. Virno considers that surplus value (the Marxist basis for capital accumulation) is produced in the "cracks between paid and unpaid labor", at that time of desire for the permanently growing knowledge of the individual. He points that knowledge and creativity define the multitude and forms it as "the power that produces", while simultaneously produces itself. 29 Paradoxically, if today's surplus of value is transformed into a surplus of knowledge, the production into self-confidence, and while communication becomes the basis of productive cooperation, then, the limitation of responsibility is questionable. It turns into its opposite, into subversively growing multitude. The potential of creativity becomes its possible counter strategy. But we can also understand it as a doxa imposed by the capitalist system of production, a fear of some sort of shortcoming, or a lack of a clear concept of work that limits the responsibility of our society. According to Virno, threatens capital, the capitalist order. But the multitude does not threaten with the destruction of capital, or elimination of it, but through inclusivity, strengthening its power, its knowledge, and the evidence of the individual's cognitive abilities today in a permanent struggle not with one another but with oneself. The multitude became 'work' -on oneself.
Claiming that the multitude is striving for "communism of capital", Virno concludes that what post-Fordism can provide is virtual communism or the socialization of a generalized intellect without material equality.
30 For "equality" is what capitalism does not produce, just as a "limited liability society" cannot produce it. Unlike the multitude that produces its own limitlessness, a "limited responsibility society" produces its own limitations, first of all in responsibilities respectfully. In order to explain the phenomena of the post-Fordist mode of production, where by production he implies not only a product, Virno, as well as Hannah Arendt, analyzes the division of human experience: "Today, I would like to discuss the classical division of human experience into three fundamental spheres: Labor (or poiesis), political Action (or praxis) and Intellect (or life of the mind). "
31
But there is one difference from Arendt's division: she sees such divisions as the terrain from which the multitude emerged. For the multitude is confirmed precisely in the merging of experiences rather than in their separation. But division in Arendt's sense, Virno analyzes, is unquestionable and in the 1960s, it was the way of thinking:
Labor is the organic exchange with nature, the production of new objects, a repetitive and foreseeable process. The pure intellect has a solitary and inconspicuous character: the meditation of the thinker escapes the notice of others; theoretical reflection mutes the world of appearances. Differently from Labor, political Action comes between social relations, not between natural materials; it has to do with the possible and the unforeseen; it does not obstruct, with ulterior motives, the context in which it operates; rather, it modifies this very context. Differently from the Intellect, political Action is public, consigned to exteriority, to contingency, to the buzzing of the 'many'; it involves, to use the words of Hannah, "the presence of others" (Human Condition, Chap. V, "Action").
32
However, according to Virno, this ancient Trinity 33 today erodes its boundaries and collapses. 34 In addition, Arendt noticed this division as a temporary passing, announcing that politics started to mimic labor, in terms the production of objects such as a state, a party, and a state system. Today, Virno claims the reverse process, that labor is receiving the characteristics of political action. Moreover, in post-Fordist labor the presence of others is found and new processes begins to more resemble political action. Nevertheless, Virno sees this process as a political crisis because, as something less complex than labor itself, the political loses its own autonomy.
This unification into one, into labor, Virno explains by the process of virtuosity. Both the virtuoso and the speaker i.e. the politician, prove their work in the presence of others, because it does not result in a final, objectified product. That is why politics is virtuous, but virtuosity is also political because it is active, it is exposed to others. In the traditional sense, 'active life' means 'political life' . That is why, according to Virno, pianist Glen Gould will give up from exposure to his audience for the feeling of contempt toward the 'political dimension' of his profession. He will identify its virtuosity with non-political, with the idea of work in the studio and the idea of a secondary product, because by avoiding virtuosity one avoids the politicity.
On the other hand, according to Marks' opinion, virtuosity does not produce surplus value, because it does not result in a final product.
35 Virtuosity is, accordingly, 'a servile and service activity' . One does not invest capital in it. But a salary is paid for virtuosity.
Nevertheless, since in post-Fordism the workers act as performers, the totality of production work takes on the characteristics of performing arts, and therefore Arendt's observation of the performers and politicians' activity clearly results in the need for a "public space for presentation":
In post-Fordism, Labor requires a "publicly organized space" and resembles a virtuosic performance (without an end product). This publicly organized space is called "cooperation" by Marx. One could say: at a certain level in the development of productive social forces, labor cooperation introjects verbal communication into itself, or, more precisely, a complex of political actions.
36
Claiming that, at times of tension, every individual is a virtuoso or performing artist, Virno explains that the basic concept of virtuosity is in fact "the activity of a speaker", since language as such and, unfolding in the presence of others, fills within itself without producing an 'object' separated from the act of speech.
We may then assume that in the work claimed by "limited responsibilities" the individual must be a virtuoso in every segment of his limited work. Consequently, the limitations then become precisely that which requires 'political' ability from the individual. Virtuosity becomes sought, demanded, expected. Virtuosity becomes multiplied. The multitude receives the character of virtuosity. In this sense, as the core of post-Fordism, Virno observes the industrial sector and the cultural industry in which the "production of communication by means of communication" takes place: "Virtuosity becomes labor for the masses with the onset of a culture industry. " 37 He 35 Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, 52.
36 Ibid, 55.
37 Ibid, 56. proves that in the cultural industry, the overlap of paid work with political action occurs, because communication activities become the most indispensable factor of work, and because responsibilities and roles are both virtuous and political at the same time. Since the physical manufacturing of objects ceased to be done manually but is automated, individual work consists of linguistic and virtuosic services. And, in the absence of the 'end product' , the ground of political action is created:
Capitalism -this is the thesis -shows that it can mechanize and parcelize even its spiritual production, exactly as it has done with agriculture and the processing of metals. Serialization, the insignificance of individual tasks and the econometrics of feelings: these are the recurrent refrains. Evidently, this critical approach allowed, in the peculiar case of the culture industry, for the continuation of some elements, which resist complete assimilation into the Fordist organization of the labor process. In the culture industry, that is to say, it was therefore necessary to maintain a certain space that was informal, not programmed, one which was open to the unforeseen spark, to communicative and creative improvisation: not in order to favor human creativity, naturally, but in order to achieve satisfactory levels of corporate productivity.
38
Virno also points to the understanding of the Frankfurt School and its criticism of the communications industry in the sense that publishing, radio, film, television, all "spirituality factories" are also organized according to the Fordistic criteria of serialization and parcelization.
39 But for Virno, the micro-spaces of the unexpected, informal or unplanned, are precisely those who resonate with potential in this interweaving of work, virtuosity and politicity. He questions them with Debor's concept of the "society of spectacle". 40 For in Debor's analysis:
'Spectacle' is human communication which has become a commodity.
41
The spectacle is capital accumulated to the point that it becomes images.
42
Furthermore, Virno produces the hypothesis that in post-Fordism precisely the communication industries have become the industries of the means of production. The role of employee no longer exists, due to the product's specificity, but rather the intensification of social, business cooperation, and co-operation among employees. Cooperation, therefore, with its 'subjective' ability and intellect becomes 'subjective cooperation' , becomes 'total quality' or the expectation of unpredictability, to communicate 'something completely new':
We can say that some distinguishing traits of the human animal, above all the possession of a language, are subsumed within capitalistic production. The inclusion of the very anthropogenesis in the existing mode of production is an extreme event [...] This event does not assuage, but radicalizes, instead, the antimonies of economic-social capitalistic formation. Nobody is as poor as those who see their own relation to the presence of others, that is to say, their own communicative faculty, their own possession of a language, reduced to wage labor. 43 Virno derives Marx's notion of real abstraction into 'thought that becomes a thing' , and the general intellect into 'public intellect' and cooperation. The fertile soil of social collaboration and the 'communicative competence of the individuals' , he sees as an intellect meant in general:
With the infinite potential of one´s own linguistic faculty as the only 'score' , a locutor (any locutor) articulates determined acts of speech: so then, the faculty of language is the opposite of determined script, of an end product with these or those unmistakable characteristics.
44
If the intellect is the basis of virtuosity, then the statement of labor under "limited responsibilities" produce a certain paradox. The limited responsibility of labor and production is actually paradoxical to the concept of production. It seems that its doxic ambitions are nothing less than a paradox approaching its full manifestation and self-destructive characteristics within the acceleration of the capitalist system. After all, but from a different angle, Virno also notes two principled consequences of this paradox -through the heterogeneity of the cooperative process. The first one he sees in political power and points of integration of knowledge and control (the inverse process of the unpredictability of virtuosity). Another consequence Virno sees in the phenomenon of 'personal dependence' , because the hierarchical relations of labor co-operation in "all concrete production operations receive a form of personal dependence": the inseparability of the product from the act of production, Virno explains, results in the questioned singularity of the one who produces, and the intense personalization of mutual addiction is introduced.
45 But this dependency does not end here. Virno also poses the following question:
The crucial question goes like this: is it possible to split that which today is united, that is, the Intellect (the general intellect) and (wage) Labor, 43 Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, 63.
44 Ibid, 66. 45 Ibid, 67. and to unite that which today is divided, that is, Intellect and political Action? Is it possible to move from the 'ancient alliance' of Intellect/Labor to a "new alliance" of Intellect/political Action? 46 The multitude is not restricting its responsibility; on the contrary, it magnifies it. The notion of responsibility, capability, and creativity becomes the "capital" of the multitude today. Seems that today only the multitude has at its disposal responsibility as such. If we consider service activity (Marx) of the multitude, a productive work resulting in the final product, then knowledge is closely bound to responsibility as such. Responsibility as potential, value, work, strategy and product are what influence us to question whether the multitude actually becomes a society of unlimited responsibility. We may understand that the unlimited responsibility of the multitude is a possible cognitive consequence or unplanned by-product of post-Fordism.
The salient traits of post-Fordist experience (servile virtuosity, exploitation of the very faculty of language, unfailing relation to the 'presence of others' , etc.) postulate, as a form of conflictual retaliation, nothing less than a radically new form of democracy.
47
Does the multitude know its limitations? Yes. But, which ones? The multitude knows the limitations from which it grows, from which it creates, and which stimulate its creativity because it is directly related to the question of existence. Thus limitation can be understood here as subversively creative, and that multitude is subversively appropriating existing forms of expressions, of laws and politics, to rework them until the critical turning point.
If the visitor to open artwork actively participates in its completion, he is involved in the process of Work as such. He is invited to understand that that precise artwork is not offering any fixed solutions but that, instead, the visitor can offer new solutions that in turn, will involve his responsibility. We may wonder here how the concepts of creativity (that is, of limitations), of presence (that is, of society) and of responsibility can be unified. They are gathered by the sense of ability and belonging, devotion and compassion.
48 They are contained in the relationship between art, sciences and humanities. Do answers lie in the times before the partialization, mechanization and serialization of goods and knowledge, in times when the arts and sciences were united? We come to question how potential is fore grounded and whether our creative activities are connected in the present world. At which tomorrow or past should we look at -is inevitable to wonder. 49 The consequences of work and production within limited responsibilities, which we leave to future generations as ever more limited, stays a crucial issue to work with.
46 Ibid, 68. 47 Ibid, 68. 48 Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, Il buio del postmoderno (Roma: Aliberti editore, 2011), 56. 49 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Quale domani? (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2004) .
